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CNOOC-UNOCAL AND THE WTO:  DISCRIMINATORY 
RULES IN THE CHINA PROTOCOL ARE A LATENT 
THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW IN THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 
Thomas P. Holt† 
Abstract: In the summer of 2005, the Chinese state-owned oil company CNOOC, 
Ltd. (“CNOOC”) attempted to purchase American-owned Unocal Corporation on very 
favorable terms.  There was a serious problem with the merger, however—the U.S. 
Congress was not about to let the People’s Republic of China (“China”) buy up an 
American company, no matter how much it was willing to pay.  Following a period of 
increasingly heated rhetoric about the deal, the U.S. Congressman representing 
competitor Chevron Corporation’s home district inserted a provision in the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 that was intended to, and did, scuttle the deal.  
The U.S. Congress’ underlying concern that Chinese ownership of a U.S. oil 
company would threaten national security (whether justified or not) obscured a 
potentially larger issue.  China had already agreed not to grant the type of subsidy that 
made CNOOC’s offer possible when it acceded to the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).  Incorporated into the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China (“China Protocol”) was a commitment that China would not use unprofitable “non-
commercial” loans from its state-owned enterprises to further state policy.  The Unocal 
acquisition was to be funded by precisely this type of subsidized loan.  The unique WTO 
rules contained in the China Protocol do more than prevent China from buying U.S. 
companies, however.  The rules are applicable only to China, and prevent conduct that 
would be allowed under any generally applicable WTO agreement.  As such, they 
undermine the core nondiscrimination principles on which the WTO was founded.  More 
seriously, unresolved interpretative conflicts between the China Protocol and the set of 
agreements into which it is putatively “integrated” will force the WTO’s panels and 
Appellate Body to make “WTO common law,” a function specifically forbidden to them.  
This will seriously undermine the legitimacy of the WTO’s crucially important Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, and call into question the continued efficacy of the 
organization as a whole. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 22, 2005, Chinese oil company CNOOC, Ltd. (“CNOOC,” a 
subsidiary of the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation1) 
made an unsolicited offer to purchase the Unocal Corporation, an American 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Craig H. Allen for his patience and insight.  Any errors 
contained herein are a departure from the high standards to which he holds his students, and are solely 
attributable to the author.  
1
  CNOOC Ltd. is 70% owned by its parent company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 
which is in turn owned by the government of the People’s Republic of China.  The parent company is the 
country’s third-largest energy company.  See Letter from Senators Conrad and Bunning to the Commerce 
Secretary Carlos Gutierrez (July 11, 2005).  The China National Offshore Oil Corporation is also known by 
the moniker “CNOOC,” but here will be referred to by its full name to avoid confusion with its overseas 
subsidiary, CNOOC Ltd. 
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oil company based in California.  CNOOC proposed to pay approximately 
sixty-seven dollars per share of publicly traded stock,2 or just shy of $20 
billion after a payment of a $500 million-plus break-up fee to rival bidder 
Chevron Corporation (“Chevron”).  The proposed transaction was to be 
funded by low- and no-interest loans from CNOOC’s state-owned parent 
company and state-owned Chinese banks.3  Due to political pressure from 
the United States Congress, however, CNOOC was not able to purchase 
Unocal despite the favorable terms that it offered.4  Technically, CNOOC 
withdrew its bid for Unocal voluntarily.5  In reality, the inclusion of a 
provision in the Energy Policy Act of 20056 (“Energy Policy Act”) specially 
designed to sink the CNOOC-Unocal merger (“CNOOC-Unocal”) was too 
serious an obstacle to the deal’s completion.  This legislation, spurred by 
concerns of members of Congress regarding the security implications of 
Chinese competition for scarce world oil supplies (among other reasons) 
would have required substantially heightened security review of the deal, 
and caused prohibitive uncertainty and delay.7   
This Comment will argue that Congress’ focus on the purported 
national security implications of the transactions obscured an issue of 
potentially longer-term significance:  the funding package that CNOOC 
proposed for the deal was a violation of Chinese market economy 
obligations under the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China (“Protocol” or “China Protocol”)8 to the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).  The People’s Republic of China (“China”) was required to make 
unique commitments as a precondition to membership in the WTO.  These 
commitments make China subject to binding international legal obligations 
that could greatly affect the conduct of its overseas investment policy as a 
non-market economy.  While the CNOOC-Unocal deal ran aground on other 
                                           
 
2
 See Paula Dittrick, CNOOC Bid Raises Stakes in the Takeover of Unocal, OIL & GAS J., June 27, 
2005, at 25. 
3
  See Lead Report, Foreign Investment:  Senators Charge CNOOC’s Unocal Bid Could Constitute 
WTO Violation, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1148 (2005). 
4
  See infra Part II; see also H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005) (engrossed as passed) (expressing the 
sense of the House of Representatives that a Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of 
critical United States energy infrastructure and energy production capacity could take action that would 
threaten to impair the national security of the United States). 
5
  See Foreign Investment: China’s CNOOC Announces Withdrawal of Bid to Acquire Unocal, 
Citing Political Opposition, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1286 (2005).   
6
  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 604 (2005). 
7
  See id. § 1837; see also Foreign Investment: Pombo Plans Amendment to Require Study of 
Chinese Oil Policy Before CNOOC Review, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1202 (2005). 
8
  See World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol]. 
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rocky shores, its proposed funding package illustrates the latent problems 
posed by the growth of non-reciprocal obligations in the world trading 
system, especially between original WTO member-states and more recent 
additions.9  The unique, stringent commitments of China in particular pose 
challenges for the WTO system.  Such “WTO-plus”10 obligations have the 
potential to throw the generally applicable system of international trade rules 
into turmoil, and to undermine the rule of law in the application of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).11 
Part II of this Comment discusses the international legal constraints 
that the proposed merger between CNOOC and Unocal faced, and how the 
deal was ultimately aborted for other reasons.  The Comment specifically 
addresses the fact that the terms of CNOOC’s proposed funding package for 
the acquisition did not meet China’s unique WTO requirement that loans 
from China’s state-owned enterprises be on a “commercial basis”.  Rather, 
the loans that CNOOC sought included strategic interest rate subsidies from 
                                           
9
   The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT 1947] laid the foundation for what would become the WTO.  The WTO was formally 
established as an international organization by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), which serves as a “cover page” 
to the rest of the WTO agreements.  See World Trade Organization, WTO Legal Texts, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited May 4, 2006).  States not party to the 
establishing agreement have the option of acceding to the WTO under Article XII of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement]. 
10
  See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade 
Organization Legal System, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003). 
11
  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].   
Perhaps no phrase in legal usage is more ambiguous than “rule of law.”  As Judith N. Shklar points 
out in her essay Political Theory and The Rule of Law, “It would not be very difficult to show that the 
phrase ‘the Rule of Law’ has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use.”  
Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and The Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1,1 
(Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).  This paper, however, does not insert itself into the 
crossfire of legal philosophy with respect to the idea.  See id. at 10 (comparing Friedrich von Hayek’s 
defense of the idea to Roberto Unger’s view of the concept as a “pure ideological cloak that must be ripped 
off to expose the fraudulence of the entire ideology of the Rule of Law.”).  
Rather, the rule of law is defined here as a practical construct:  a system under which decisions with 
respect to rights and obligations are made according to pre-defined set of generally applicable rules.  
Couched in the negative, the absence of the rule of law is demonstrated when rights and obligations are 
defined solely as result of the relative power of those affected by their application.  In the words of the 
former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body, James Bacchus, “The rule of law is, above all, not 
politics . . . . With the rule of law, the law is certain, not arbitrary.  With the rule of law, the law is written 
beforehand, and the rules are defined and known in advance.  With the rule of law, the law is written to 
apply to all equally, and all, in practice and in reality, are equal before the law.  With the rule of law, no 
one is beneath the concern of the law or above it.  Only this can rightly be called the rule of law.”  James 
Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotious: The WTO and the International Rule of Law, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
533, 546 (2003).   
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the Chinese government, subsidies that China agreed not to use as a 
precondition to its membership in the WTO.  Part III discusses how this 
commitment, as an “integrated” part of the WTO system of agreements,  
imposes on China trade rules not generally applicable to other WTO 
members, and how the financing package would have been legal under 
generally applicable WTO agreements.  Part III further demonstrates how 
any WTO member could have utilized the WTO’s dispute settlement system 
to challenge or stall the proposed transaction, regardless of their level of 
involvement.  Part IV argues that the asymmetry of rule obligations imposed 
on China by the Protocol threatens the rule of law in the world trading 
system’s dispute settlement mechanism, and could threaten the effectiveness 
of the WTO generally.  Finally, this Comment closes with an argument that 
the imposition of unique burdens on acceding WTO members, illustrated by 
the China protocol, is antithetical to the mission of the WTO and should be 
discontinued in future accessions of transitional economy states.  
II. CNOOC’S PROPOSED FUNDING PACKAGE IMPLICATED CHINA’S WTO 
COMMITMENTS, BUT THE DEAL WAS SCUTTLED FOR OTHER REASONS  
Protestations to the contrary aside,12 CNOOC’s bid for Unocal was 
part of a strategic initiative by China to secure increased access to 
petroleum.13  The attempted acquisition was part of a concerted effort to 
meet the country’s massive, and massively growing, demand for energy.14  
This was not, in itself, a problem.  After all, the United States aggressively 
and actively promotes policies that result in greater control of energy 
infrastructure and greater access to petroleum15 in order to meet what is 
indisputably the world’s greatest demand for fuel.16  Similarly, the fact that 
China proposed to subsidize the transaction is wholly unremarkable; 
investment subsidies for key strategic enterprises, in one form or another, are 
                                           
12
  See Dittrick, supra note 2, at 25 (CNOOC stated that it sought to acquire Unocal because the 
“combined company would have a leading position in the Asian energy market . . . .”) 
13
  China has a stated policy of increasing the capacity of its strategic petroleum reserves.  See, e.g., 
Letter from Senators Conrad and Bunning to the Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, supra note 1.  
14
  For example, twelve days after the collapse of the merger, the state-owned China National 
Petroleum Corporation reached an agreement to acquire Canadian PetroKazakhstan. For an audio 
discussion regarding the issue, visit National Public Radio’s website and listen to Mike Shuster, China's Oil 
Demand Complicates Relations with U.S., http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4965017 
(follow “Listen” link to download a radio report airing differing views on the extent to which the attempted 
acquisition represented part of an overarching government program to acquire increased access to oil 
assets) (last visited May 4, 2006).   
15
  See generally Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 604 (2005).  
16
  Measured either by volume or per capita.  See, e.g., Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Supply 
and demand: World oil markets under pressure, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/oil/supply_demand 
.html (last May 4, 2006).   
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a common feature of the world commodity trade.17  While it is certainly the 
prerogative of United States lawmakers to prevent foreign investment that 
they believe (correctly or not) threatens U.S. national security, it is equally 
China’s prerogative to pursue policies that will give its citizens greater 
access to key resources.  
What was problematic about the non-commercial motive for the 
Unocal acquisition, however, was the fact that China agreed as a 
precondition to membership in the WTO that its state-owned enterprises 
would not be the mechanisms by which such policy choices would be 
implemented.18  Like any state, China acts with a multiplicity of different 
motives for every one of its official acts.  Under the Protocol, however, its 
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), including its banks and oil companies, 
must make their decisions on the basis of factors associated with commercial 
considerations, i.e., the profitability of a given transaction.  China’s SOEs, in 
other words, are required to act as if they were private entities in their 
conduct in international trade.  One way to conceptualize the distinction is to 
remember that states, not lenders, may have multiple motives.  A lender, 
acting commercially, may only have one legitimate motive under the 
Protocol: to create profit.  Therefore, securing greater energy security for the 
Chinese people, at the direction of the Chinese government, is not a 
commercial motive under the Protocol if the transaction through which that 
goal is effected is not one which will provide the financing SOE profit.   
China made this commitment, as well as many others, as part of its 
negotiations with the WTO Working Party on the Accession of China 
(“Working Party”) regarding accession to the world trading body, and is 
legally bound to them under international law.19  Moreover, the Working 
Party Report on the Accession of China20 (“Working Party Report”), with its 
record of unique commitments, is incorporated into the China Protocol, 
which in turn is made “an integral part of the WTO Agreement.”21     
                                           
17
  The United States, for example, commonly gives tax and other relief to its giant (if privately-
owned) energy companies with the understanding that benefits reaped in the form of greater 
competitiveness will ultimately accrue to the national interest.  See, e.g., Energy Policy Act § 1323.  For a 
recent example of additional proposed legislation, see Refinery Investment Tax Assistance Act of 2005, S. 
1781, 109th Cong. (2005); cf. H.R. 4420, 109th Cong. (2005) (to repeal tax subsidies enacted by the 
Energy Policy Act for the oil and gas industry). 
18
  See World Trade Organization, Working Party on the Accession of China, Working Party Report 
on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Working Party Report], para. 
172. 
19
  See infra Part II.B.  
20
  Working Party Report, para. 172.  
21
   Protocol § 1.2. 
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A. China’s Unocal Loans to CNOOC Would Not Have Been “On a 
Commercial Basis” 
China may have had both strategic and commercial interests in 
acquiring Unocal, but by directing its SOEs to make unprofitable loans in 
order to finance the deal, it was directing them to act in a non-commercial 
manner.  It was to the strategic aspects of the transaction that the United 
States Congress reacted with the Energy Policy Act.   
CNOOC instigated its “friendly”22 bid for Unocal following the start 
of other negotiations for that company with Chevron.  CNOOC’s proffered 
explanation for its interest in acquiring the California company23 was that it 
believed the combined companies would have a leading position in the Asian 
energy market and an expanded role in the development of China’s liquefied 
natural gas market.24  CNOOC expected the transaction to more than double 
its oil and natural gas production and to almost double its reserves.25  As a 
preliminary gesture to calm worries in American political circles about the 
potential energy security implications of the transaction, CNOOC offered its 
“assurances” on a number of factors:  that it would continue to sell all 
products of Unocal’s U.S. properties in U.S. markets, that it would retain all 
of Unocal’s employees and managers, if possible, and that it would divest 
Unocal’s non-North American assets to the extent that such divestitures 
would not have a “material adverse effect on Unocal.”26 
The terms of the deal offered were considerably more favorable than 
those posed by Chevron in a deal that Unocal’s Board of Directors had 
already recommended to Unocal stockholders.  Compared to the $67 in cash 
per share of stock that CNOOC offered, amounting to about $18.5 billion, 
Chevron had previously agreed to offer Unocal stockholders an election 
between $65 per share of stock, 1.03 shares of Chevron common stock, or 
some combination thereof27—an offer worth somewhere in the 
neighborhood of a billion dollars less to Unocal shareholders.28  Moreover, 
unlike CNOOC, Chevron had already stated that it planned to make 
                                           
22
  See Dittrick, supra note 2, at 25. 
23
  Both Chevron and Unocal are based in California.  See Chevron, Company Profile, http://www. 
chevron.com/about/company_profile; see also Unocal, A History of Unocal, http://www.unocal.com/about 
ucl/history/index.htm (last visited May 4, 2006).  
24
  See Dittrick, supra note 2, at 25.  
25
  Id. 
26
  Id.  
27
  Id. 
28
  See Kurt S. Abraham, FTC Accepts Chevron’s Unocal Plan, CNOOC Challenges, WORLD OIL, 
July 1, 2005, at 11.  
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significant cuts in the Unocal workforce should the merger be approved.29  
CNOOC’s superior commitments were not enough, however, to ease the 
fears of U.S. lawmakers.  
In spite of terms that arguably amounted to overpayment for a 
struggling U.S. company embroiled in various liabilities30 and guarantees 
that the merger would not impact American energy security,31 CNOOC’s bid 
for Unocal ignited an immediate firestorm of political opposition.32  Fifty 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives asked the U.S. Treasury 
Department to review the transaction for economic and strategic 
implications under the oversight of the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (“CFIUS”),33 citing security concerns.  This provoked a 
response that the House members may not have expected.  CNOOC 
responded by stating that the company “had planned for and want[ed] to 
participate in a CFIUS review of the transaction as soon as possible,” going 
on to say that “we believe it is vital to the success of the possible merged 
company.”34  The company was willing for the merger to undergo security 
review.  Hesitations about the deal, however, extended beyond the House of 
Representatives.  
Across the Capitol rotunda, the transaction was stirring emotion in the 
U.S. Senate as well.  Several members of the Senate Finance Committee also 
pressed for CFIUS review.35  Ultimately, the rhetoric against China became 
so heated that Beijing responded, stating, “We demand that the U.S. 
Congress correct its mistaken method of politicizing economic and trade 
issues, and stop interfering in normal business dealings between enterprises 
of the two countries . . . .”36  Not surprisingly, this diplomacy was poorly 
received in Congress.  Not long after China’s frustrated outburst, Senators 
Kent Conrad and Jim Bunning were emboldened to raise the question of 
                                           
29
  See Dittrick, supra note 2, at 25. 
30
  See, e.g., Mark Lifsher,  Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses at Myanmar 
Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at C1. 
31
  See Dittrick, supra note 2, at 25. 
32
  See, e.g., H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005). 
33
  Letter from the United States House of Representatives to John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury, 
June 24, 2005. 
34
  From an Open letter from Fu Chegyu to the United States House of Representatives, June 27, 
2005.  See Foreign Investment: Fifty House Members Ask Snow to Review Chinese Bid for Unocal, 22 
INT’L TRADE REP. 1070 (2005).  In addition, on June 30, Rep. Joe Barton, Chairman of the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee, announced that House hearings would be commenced on the deal in “the very 
near future.”  See Foreign Investment: Barton Calls for Hearing on China Unocal Bid; CNOOC Seeks 
CFIUS Review, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1119 (2005). 
35
  See Foreign Investment: Senators Press Administration for Review of Chinese Oil Firm CNOOC’s 
Bid for Unocal, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1070 (2005).   
36
  Id.  
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China’s WTO commitments.  In a letter37 dated July 11, 2005 to the 
Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and U.S. Trade Representative Rob 
Portman, the Senators alleged that China may have violated its WTO 
commitments by providing what the letter called a “direct subsidy” to 
CNOOC.  The letter called for the two officials to raise the issue at the Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade (“JCCT”) in Beijing that same day.38  
The concerns of the Senators were not addressed at the JCCT.39  
Ultimately, the deal was doomed by competing amendments 
introduced in the House and the Senate that only tangentially implicated the 
WTO.  Representative Richard Pombo introduced an amendment to the 
Energy Policy Act that ultimately required, beyond CFIUS review, an 
extensive additional “study of the growing energy requirements” of China 
and their implications for the United States.40  This was perhaps not 
coincidental given the fact that CNOOC competitor Chevron has its 
headquarters in his California district.41  Contemporaneously, Senator 
Charles Schumer of New York added yet another hurdle for CNOOC.  He 
                                           
37
  The text of the letter reads:   
 
The Chinese government holds a 70 percent stake in CNOOC, and this proposed acquisition is 
clearly intended to advance the Chinese government’s stated policy of building strategic energy 
reserves. . . . Indeed, the proposed acquisition is not being conducted on commercial terms, and 
has little commercial justification.  CNOOC’s bid for Unocal will require CNOOC to secure $16 
billion in funding from outside sources.  Of this $16 billion, $13 billion will be provided by 
entities owned by Chinese government; and $7 billion of this funding will be in the form of no-
interest or low-interest loans from its state-owned parent company.  This below-market financing 
arrangement is a direct subsidy provided by the Chinese government to CNOOC, through a state-
owned enterprise.  In addition, the remaining $6 billion will be provided by state-owned banks, 
which often do not seek repayment of their loans.  Without this subsidy, it is clear that CNOOC’s 
bid would be uncompetitive and unworthy of consideration by Unocal’s shareholders. . . . The 
financing arrangement . . . appears to violate commitments that China made when entering the . . . 
WTO.  For example, China assured members that its state-owned banks would only lend to state-
owned enterprises on market terms.  The CNOOC transaction illustrates that China has failed to 
abide by this commitment. 
 
Letter from Senators Conrad and Bunning to the Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, supra note 1. 
38
  See Foreign Investment: Senators Charge CNOOC’s Unocal Bid Could Constitute WTO 
Violation, supra note 3. 
39
  Id. 
40
  See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1837(a), 119 Stat. 604 (2005); see also 
Foreign Investment: Energy Policy Act to Mandate China Energy Study; Inhofe Seeks to Toughen CFIUS, 
22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1242 (2005).  The required review would have added months of uncertainty to the 
proposed deal or any similar transaction.  As an added kick on the way out the door, the bill also included 
an “assessment of the extent to which investment in energy assets . . . has been on market-based terms and 
free from subsidies” from China.  See Energy Policy Act § 1837(a)(4).  
41
  Chevron is headquartered in San Ramon, California.  See supra note 23.  San Ramon is in the 11th 
California congressional district.  See U.S. Representative Richard Pombo, 11th District, http://www.house. 
gov/pombo/district/district.htm (last visited May 4, 2006). 
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appended42 to a State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations 
bill43 a requirement that when any state-owned company sought to acquire 
an American company, an additional study be performed on trade 
reciprocity.44  The same day, the Unocal Board once again recommended to 
shareholders that the lesser Chevron offer be accepted.45   
On August second, CNOOC withdrew its bid, citing “unprecedented 
political opposition” and asserting that, operating with purely commercial 
motives, it had been willing to “address any legitimate concerns” U.S. policy 
makers might have had.46  The question of whether or not the proposed 
financing package violated China’s commitments under the Protocol was 
dropped.  On August tenth, the shareholders of Unocal approved Chevron’s 
takeover.47   
B. China Agreed Not to Make Policy Loans from Its State-Owned 
Enterprises as a Precondition to Membership in the WTO   
While it is certainly not unusual for national governments to direct 
investment to certain areas which may increase either their economic or 
military security,48 China’s situation is complicated by unique market 
economy obligations in the China Protocol.  As a precondition to entry into 
the WTO, China was forced to make certain specific and unique 
commitments with regard to the intersection of its state-owned enterprises 
(“SOEs”) and its conduct in international trade.49  Among those 
commitments was an agreement by China to forgo the strategic use of low- 
or no-interest loans by SOEs to strategically secure market share in the trade 
of goods, services, and commodities in a manner not available to more fully 
marketized nations.50  Precisely why the original WTO members felt it 
necessary to impose numerous strictures on China is beyond the scope of 
this Comment.  It is clear, however, that the strategic use of such loans by 
Chinese SOEs in acquisitions of overseas oil and energy services companies 
implicates China’s unique commitments under the Protocol.  
                                           
42
  S. Amdt. 1304, 109th Cong. (2005). 
43
  H.R. 3057, 109th Cong. (2005). 
44
  See Foreign Investment: Sen. Schumer’s Amendment to Foreign Ops Bill Would Delay CNOOC 
Purchase of Unocal, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1246 (2005). 
45
  Id. 
46
  Id. 
47
  See Associated Press Release, Unocal Shareholders Approve Chevron’s $18 Billion Takeover 
Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005.  
48
  See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1323, 119 Stat. 604 (2005). 
49
  See Qin, supra note 10, at 505-06. 
50
  Id.  
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Because the WTO is premised on free-market assumptions, the 
integration of China’s “socialist market system”51 creates problems.  The 
potential trade-distorting effects of large scale state ownership of industry in 
China52 spurred the WTO Working Party on the Accession of China 
(“Working Party”) to require commitments by China to not make loans or set 
interest rates for non-commercial reasons.  There is also significant cause to 
believe that the United States utilized the accession negotiation to put in 
place obligations as a check on Chinese economic growth.53  These 
commitments were made specifically in Paragraphs 172 and 173 of the 
Working Party Report, explicitly incorporated into the Protocol by Paragraph 
342 of the Working Party Report, and constitute international legal 
commitments binding China.   
To address the concerns of the Working Party54 about the integration 
of China’s “socialist market system”55 into the WTO, China confirmed that 
“all state-owned and state-invested enterprises would make purchases and 
sales based solely on commercial considerations . . . .”56  In other words, 
China agreed not to direct the commercial decisions of its SOEs on the basis 
of strategic or policy considerations that are divorced from immediate profit 
and loss.  Chinese SOEs under the socialist market model envisioned by the 
Protocol are to act in a manner effectively identical to private enterprises.57  
While the Chinese government may have multiple policy goals for any given 
sector, it agreed not to utilize subsidies to its SOEs to fulfill those goals.  
                                           
51
  See Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)—A Critical 
Appraisal of the China Protocol, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 863, 872 (2004) (noting that a socialist market 
economy is defined as one “in which prices are set by the marketplace and public ownership dominates but 
coexists with private and other non-state sectors”).  
52
  See Working Party Report, para.171 (“Some members of the Working Party expressed concern 
that the special features of China’s economy . . . still created the potential for a certain level of trade 
distorting subsidization . . . .”).  There continues to be a debate about whether or not certain SOEs 
investment measures actually significantly distort trade.  See, e.g., Qin, supra note 10, at 503. 
53
  See infra note 146.  
54
  Many of the concerns of the Working Party could more accurately be characterized as the 
concerns of the United States.  Simultaneous with the Working Party’s negotiation with China regarding 
the terms of its Accession to the WTO, delicate bilateral negotiations were taking place with the United 
States.  Much of the language of China’s Working Party Report commitments was adopted verbatim from 
the results of the U.S.-China talks.  See, e.g., Qin, supra note 51, at 913. 
55
  China continues to maintain state ownership and control of major industries, and to manage them 
in manner consistent with a planned economy.  The idea behind “market socialism” was that ownership of 
industry would continue to be held by the Chinese state, but that industry would be independently managed 
in response to market forces.  See supra note 51.   
56
  Working Party Report, para. 46. 
57
  See Working Party Report, para. 43 (“The representative of China stated that the state-owned 
enterprises of China basically operated in accordance with rules of market economy.  The government 
would no longer directly administer the human, finance and material resources, and operational activities 
such as production, supply and marketing.”). 
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Presumably, this distinction between the actions of the government as 
government and the actions of government as owner was considered by the 
Working Party to be a necessary prerequisite to membership in the WTO 
club.  Whatever the motivation of the Working Party, however, the Protocol 
clearly prohibits subsidies—whether in the form of direct payments or loan 
forgiveness—intended to direct the actions of SOEs for policy reasons.58  
The Protocol requires the decisions of SOEs to be made on the same bases 
that private industries use.  That is, whether a given transaction will be 
profitable or not.  Critically, if a transaction would not be profitable without 
subsidization, then that transaction is not being undertaken for commercial 
reasons.59  Most importantly, in the context of below-market interest rate 
subsidies from SOEs for the purpose of acquiring energy assets, China made 
commitments, recorded in paragraphs 172 and 173 of the Working Party 
Report, that its financial institutions should be “run on a commercial 
basis,”60 and that China would “reduce the availability of certain types of 
subsidies, in particular by . . . making government-owned banks operate on a 
commercial basis.”61 
C. The Working Party Report Amounts to a Treaty between China and the 
WTO, and Is an “Integral Part of the WTO Agreement”   
China’s Accession Protocol has a unique status in the WTO system 
that makes the restrictions on Chinese SOEs relevant outside the isolated 
circumstances of CNOOC-Unocal.  First, each paragraph in the Working 
Party Report in which a commitment by China to the WTO is recorded is 
“noted” by the Working Party in Paragraph 342 of the Working Party 
Report.62  The Working Party further “notes” that China’s commitments “are 
incorporated in paragraph 1.2 of the Draft Protocol,”63 which entered into 
force as the China Protocol.64  The Declaration of Accession65 itself, in its 
                                           
58
  See Working Party Report, paras. 172, 173.  For discussion, see infra Part II.D.   
59
  This is hardly an interpretive leap when it comes to the term “commercial.”  The dictionary 
definition of the term is “Having profit, success, or immediate results as chief aim.”  See American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 267 (William Morris, ed., Houghton Mifflin, 1970).  This 
interpretation is also supported by WTO jurisprudence.  See Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/R ¶ 757 (July 31, 2000) (“The list of variables that 
can be used to assess whether a state-trading action is based on commercial consideration [is comprised 
of] . . . prices, availability etc. . . .”). 
60
  Working Party Report, para. 172. 
61
  Id. at para. 173. 
62
  Id. at para. 342.  
63
  Id. 
64
  In standard WTO form, the Declaration of Accession serves as a “cover page” to the larger 
agreement contained in the Protocol.  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 23 
November 2001, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (2001). 
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preamble, also refers to “the results of the negotiations directed toward the 
establishment of the terms of accession of the [PRC] to the [WTO 
Agreement].”66  In case there should be any mistake as to the import of this, 
the Protocol also makes note of the Working Party Report,67 before declaring 
in one of its opening paragraphs that:  
The WTO Agreement to which China accedes shall be the WTO 
Agreement as rectified, amended or otherwise modified by such 
legal instruments as may have entered into force before the date 
of accession.  This Protocol, which shall include the 
commitments referred to in paragraph 342 of the Working Party 
Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement.68   
This agreement, incorporated into the greater system of WTO 
agreements, constitutes a binding treaty between China and the WTO.  
According to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organizations69 (“VCLT-IO”),70 a treaty is 
an international agreement, in written form, between a state and one or more 
international organizations, whether that agreement is contained in one or 
multiple related instruments.71  Here, the combined Working Party Report 
and Protocol clearly qualify and consequently are binding international law 
cognizable by the WTO’s dispute resolution bodies.  
                                                                                                                              
65
  Id.  
66
  Id.   
67
  Working Party Report, pmbl. 
68
  Protocol § 1.2. 
69
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 [hereinafter VCLT-IO].  In past 
decision of the WTO Appellate Body, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, has been used as the guidepost for WTO agreement interpretation.  See, 
e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), at 17 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States forms 
“general rule of interpretation . . . [and] has attained the status of a rule of customary or general 
international law”); see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 469, 480 (2003).  Dr. Ehlermann is former chairman of the Appellate Body.   
In this case, the agreement at issue is arguably one between the WTO and China, rather than between 
the WTO member-nations and China, and the 1969 Convention is inapplicable.  This is an academic 
distinction for interpretive purposes, however: Article 2, as well as Articles 31 and 32 of the two treaties, 
those governing interpretation of international agreements, are duplicative.  See infra Part III.D. 
70
  It is hoped that the use of this abbreviation does not create confusion with the similarly named 
1969 Convention, but if it does, it will not be too great a tragedy for readers’ understanding.  The operative 
language examined here is identical.  See supra note 69. 
71
  VCLT-IO, supra note 69,  art. 2.  
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D. Properly Interpreted, China’s Unique Commitments Would Have 
Barred the Funding Package  
Article 31 of the VCLT-IO provides that, “A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”72  
The context under which the agreement was entered is to be determined by 
the text itself, including its preamble and annexes, as well as any related 
agreements.73  Together with the context, interpretation is based on 
subsequent agreements that address the interpretation of the primary 
agreement, as well as subsequent practice of the parties and any other 
relevant rules of international law.74    
Under the “ordinary meaning” test generally given the greatest weight 
by the WTO Appellate Body,75 Paragraph 172 of the Working Party Report 
states that SOEs, including banks, should be run on a commercial basis.76  
Immediately following, the Working Party notes that this is the 
commitment—that SOEs run on a commercial basis, and be responsible for 
their profits and losses.77  Again, it is critical to make the distinction between 
the multiple goals allowed to the state when acting in its capacity as such, 
and the circumscribed conduct allowed to the state in its capacity as owner 
of SOEs.  In its capacity as owner, the state may not utilize subsidies to its 
SOEs for the purpose of furthering conduct in a manner that would not be 
available to states where those same enterprises would be in private hands. 
Subsidies to SOEs, granted for the purpose of making an otherwise losing 
transaction profitable, in order to further a state policy goal are precisely 
those forbidden by the Protocol.  Under the Protocol, the decisions of 
Chinese SOEs must be made on the basis of increasing profit and avoiding 
loss.  Subsidies that alter this calculus are forbidden.  This is the meaning of 
the “commercial basis” requirement.  No reasonable ordinary-meaning 
interpretation would take this to allow for the provision of loans that return 
little or no interest, like those proposed for the Unocal acquisition, because 
there is simply no commercial rationale for such loans.  Accordingly, the 
only rationale for them must be a strategic or policy one, and consequently a 
violation of the commitment.  
                                           
72
  VCLT-IO supra note 69, art. 31. 
73
  Id.  
74
  Id.  
75
  See Ehlermann, supra note 69, at 480. 
76
  See Working Party Report, para. 172.  
77
  Id. 
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Paragraph 173 presents a harder case under the ordinary-meaning test, 
but not by much.  The sentence “The Working Party took note of this 
commitment” clearly modifies the preceding one—that “China would 
progressively work towards a full notification of subsidies, as contemplated 
by Article 25 of the SCM Agreement.”78  The “SCM Agreement” is the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.79  This notification 
requirement80 commitment makes little sense, however, when read without 
reference to the preceding sentence, commenting that China was attempting 
to reduce the availability of subsidies, in particular those related to 
noncommercial bank loans.  Seen from this perspective, it becomes clear 
that Paragraphs 172 and 173 must be read together to constitute a 
commitment on the part of China to forgo the use of investment subsidies 
from SOEs to achieve state economic or security policy goals—the precise 
type of subsidy at issue in CNOOC-Unocal.  Whether or not China may 
have commercial, strategic, macroeconomic, and other policy goals when it 
subsidizes industries is irrelevant.  The only allowable considerations from 
the perspective of the enterprise involved in the transaction at issue are 
commercial ones.  It is precisely this separation of multiple and overlapping 
state interests from the operation of SOEs at which the Protocol attempts to 
strike.  
This conclusion is supported by both the context81 under which the 
Working Party agreements were made and the objects and purposes82 of the 
negotiated commitments that are incorporated into the China Protocol 
through the Working Party Report.83  China acceded to the WTO in the 
context of becoming integrated into the market system84 and reducing and 
                                           
78
  See Working Party Report, para. 173.   
79
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement]; see Working Party Report, para. 172.  Paragraph 172 then notes the Chinese representative’s 
belief that some subsidies would not confer a “benefit,” a definitional element under the SCM Agreement.  
Nonetheless, the representative pointed out that China’s objective was that “state-owned enterprises, 
including banks, should be run on a commercial basis and be responsible for their own profits and losses.”  
See id. 
80
  Some context is required to understand why this is notable.  Under the SCM Agreement, WTO 
members are required to notify the general council regarding the existence of subsidies, so they can be 
examined as to whether they fall under the definition of banned price supports.  See SCM Agreement art. 
25.  In China’s case, the lack of notification is particularly relevant; China’s Accession Schedule requires 
that price supports of various kinds be reported and/or phased out at various points preceding or following 
accession.  See Protocol § 10.1.  Thus, failure to report prohibited subsidies could be a preface to reneging 
on commitments to phase them out. 
81
  See VCLT-IO, supra note 69, art. 31.1 
82
  Id. 
83
  See supra Part II.C. 
84
  See Qin, supra note 10, at 504-7. 
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eliminating state behavior that distorts market outcomes.85  The objects and 
purposes of agreements are the final major factors that the WTO Appellate 
body gives significant weight.86  With respect to the objects and purposes of 
the China Protocol, it is equally clear that the Protocol was intended by the 
Working Party to serve as a restriction on China’s use of its SOEs for non-
market purposes.87  Were this not the case, it is hard to see why the Working 
Party would have mentioned, repeatedly, its concerns regarding China’s 
conduct via its SOEs.88   
More importantly, had the Working Party and the General Council89 
not intended the Protocol to impose substantive disciplines on the conduct of 
the SOEs, it would not have imposed special subsidy notification 
requirements on China.90  Neither would it have clarified that all subsidies to 
SOEs would be viewed as “specific” to an enterprise or industry under the 
SCM Agreement, and thus automatically be subject to the “Actionable 
Subsidies” provisions of Article 3 of that agreement.91  The objects and 
purposes of the Protocol are, among other things, to impose market 
discipline on China as a world trading partner, and thus open to it the 
benefits of membership in the WTO.92  These market disciplines would have 
barred the use of selective interest rate subsidies from SOEs to CNOOC. 
The commitments in the Working Party Report were violated and are 
enforceable against China by any WTO member under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.  This was not by mistake; in order for China to 
accede to the WTO, it had to agree to special conditions enforceable against 
it but inapplicable against any other member.  It is precisely these WTO-plus 
rules of decision that promise to create problems within the DSU in the 
future.  
                                           
85
  See Working Party Report, para. 6 (noting that China’s reform measures tend toward “a separation 
of government from enterprise”); cf. Qin, supra note 51, at 895-96 (arguing that the Protocol’s assumption 
that China’s SOEs are particularly damaging to trade is misplaced).   
86
  See VCLT-IO, supra note 69, art. 31.1; see also Ehlermann, supra note 69, at 480. 
87
  See supra Part II.B. 
88
  See, e.g., Working Party Report, paras. 43-50, 171-76. 
89
  The General Council consists of all WTO member states acting in their “legislative” capacity (i.e., 
in the capacity of drafting agreements). 
90
  See Protocol § 10.1. 
91
  See Protocol § 10.2.  This is an extremely important (and unique) provision.  It provides that states 
that would seek to challenge SOE subsidies have a difficult threshold question—whether subsidies are 
intended for a specific policy purpose, already answered in the affirmative.  Essentially, the provision 
considerably lightens the burden of a state that wishes to challenge PRC subsidies.  For a thorough 
discussion of the “specificity” provision in the Protocol, see Qin, supra note 51, at 889-92.  
92
  See supra note 55. 
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III. NO GENERALLY APPLICABLE SECTION OF THE WTO AGREEMENT 
WOULD HAVE BARRED CNOOC’S FUNDING PROPOSAL, BUT ANY 
MEMBER COULD HAVE STOPPED THE DEAL 
China’s unique commitments, as an integral part of the rules of 
decision under the DSU would have barred the CNOOC-Unocal funding 
package.  At the same time, any other member of the WTO could have used 
its SOEs for precisely the same purposes that would have been barred to 
China.  The deal was perfectly acceptable under the generally applicable 
rules of the WTO.  The funding package would have been acceptable under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures93 
(“TRIMs”) because that agreement is limited to certain types of investment 
measures not at issue in CNOOC-Unocal.  Similar problems make the SCM 
Agreement inapplicable.  Moreover, the Chinese interest rate subsidies at 
issue in CNOOC-Unocal would have been allowed under the Uruguay 
Round Amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade94 
(“GATT 1994”) and thus not amenable to challenge under the DSU.  Under 
the China Protocol, however, the funding package could have hypothetically 
subjected China to everything from requests for burdensome consultations to 
outright countermeasures by any other WTO member. 
A. TRIMS Did Not Apply to CNOOC-Unocal Because the Deal Was Not 
Covered by the Agreement 
The first investigation to be made when confronted with a 
questionable investment measure by a WTO member-state is whether 
TRIMs bars the measure.  The CNOOC-Unocal financing package would 
not have been so barred.  While there is no decision by a competent WTO 
judicial body on the scope and application of Article 1 of TRIMs,95 which 
defines the investment measures covered as those related to goods, the 
agreement is generally considered to be limited to a certain class of 
measures.96  As the Dispute Settlement Panel clarified in Indonesia—Autos, 
                                           
93
  Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs]. 
94
  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
95
  See World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice—
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ 
analytic_index_e/trims_01_e.htm#pB (last visited May 4, 2006). 
96
  See Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 24 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 135-41 (2003). 
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referring to TRIMs Article 2’s definition of the scope of the agreement,97 “In 
the case of the TRIMs Agreement, what is prohibited are TRIMs in the form 
of local content requirements, not the grant of an advantage, such as a 
subsidy.”98  The “illustrative list” appended to the TRIMs agreement 
confirms this interpretation of its scope. Covered measures are those 
“mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative 
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage,” that 
require the use of domestic content in production by foreign-owned 
companies, or import restrictions on production components.99  Accordingly, 
the investment at issue in CNOOC-Unocal is far outside the scope of 
TRIMs. 
B. The SCM Agreement Also Did Not Apply to the CNOOC Because the 
Subsidy Would Not Have Caused Adverse Effects to U.S. Industry  
In spite of the subsidized nature of the CNOOC-Unocal financing 
package, it was within the bounds of acceptable state conduct under the 
SCM Agreement.  Although the China Protocol makes all subsidies to SOEs 
de jure “specific” to an industry for purposes of the SCM Agreement,100 the 
subsidies at issue in CNOOC-Unocal would not have triggered any of the 
agreement’s prohibitions or grounds for remedy.  First, subsidies prohibited 
outright by the SCM Agreement are, like forbidden investment measures in 
TRIMs, those contingent on domestic content requirements or preferences 
for domestic products.  Second, as to those subsidies that are “actionable” 
under Part III of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy must cause “adverse effects 
to the interests of other Members.”101 For example, subsidies that injure the 
domestic industry of another member, nullify another member’s GATT 1994 
Article II102 benefits, or cause “serious prejudice” to the interests of another 
member are barred.103  Simply put, the “actionable subsidies” of the SCM 
Agreement are those which would constitute export dumping to the 
                                           
97
  Article 2.1 of TRIMs states that the scope of the measures inconsistent with the agreement are 
those which violate the provisions of Articles III and XI of GATT 1994, discussing national treatment in 
taxation and regulation, and elimination of quantitative restrictions, respectively.  TRIMs arts. 2.1, 2.2; see 
GATT 1994, supra note 94, arts. III, XI.  
98
  Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.50-14.52  
WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia—Autos]. 
99
  TRIMs Annex I.  
100
  See supra note 91. 
101
  SCM Agreement art. 5.  
102
  Article II of GATT 1994 outlays members’ concessions and commitments under the Agreement.  
Relevant to the inquiry of subsidies is the ability to impose countervailing duties in response to barred 
export dumping done for the purpose of gaining market power.  See GATT 1994 art. II.2(b).  
103
  SCM Agreement art. 5(a)-(c). 
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detriment of trading partners’ specific industries.  CNOOC-Unocal would 
thus not have been prohibited by the agreement because dumping issues 
were not implicated. 
CNOOC-Unocal would have actually kept more workers employed at 
Unocal, as well as giving Unocal shareholders a significantly better return 
on their investment than the Chevron offer.  Similarly, the proposed 
acquisition would not have impaired the United States’ ability under Article 
II of GATT 1994 to challenge dumping practices.  As for the argument that 
the acquisition might have caused “serious prejudice” to the interests of the 
United States, such prejudice is deemed to exist by Article 6 of the SCM 
Agreement when a specific product is subsidized, ad valorem, more than 5 
percent, or when subsidies are granted to cover an industry’s operating 
losses.104  The only sense in which the United States could arguably have 
been said to have suffered serious prejudice as a result CNOOC-Unocal 
merger was that the “effect of the subsidy [would have been] an increase in 
the  world market share of the subsidizing member in a particular 
subsidized . . . commodity . . . .”105  As the Panel pointed out in Indonesia—
Autos, however, “serious prejudice may only arise . . . where there is 
‘displacement or impedance of imports of a like product from another 
Member’ or price undercutting ‘as compared with the like product of another 
Member . . . .’”106  In other words, the “serious prejudice” provision, like the 
rest of Article 6, is meant to provide a remedy for dumping, not subsidized 
overseas investments of the type at issue in CNOOC-Unocal. 
C. GATT 1994 Would Not Have Barred CNOOC-Unocal Because 
Neither China’s Nondiscrimination nor Its National Treatment 
Obligations Were Implicated 
It is unlikely that any reasonable interpretation of GATT 1994 would 
be even remotely implicated by the CNOOC-Unocal transaction.  GATT 
1994, like its predecessor agreement,107 is intended to serve two general 
purposes related to the trade in goods: (1) to provide a generalized most-
favored nation (or nondiscrimination) obligation among WTO members, so 
that any trade advantages extended by one WTO member to another must be 
extended to all members,108 and (2) to institutionalize the principle of 
                                           
104
  SCM Agreement art. 6.  
105
  SCM Agreement art. 6.3(d). 
106
  Indonesia—Autos, ¶ 14.201.   
107
  GATT 1947.  
108
  See GATT 1994 art. I; see also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, at 10 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO], available at World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, 
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national treatment whereby members may not discriminate between 
domestic and imported goods either in taxation or regulation.109  China, in 
attempting to subsidize the acquisition of Unocal, was almost certainly not 
doing so because Unocal was American, but simply because the acquisition 
served China’s national interest.  Accordingly, the nondiscrimination 
principle was not implicated.  Similarly, China was not using its internal 
regulation to differentiate between domestic and foreign goods; rather, it was 
attempting to acquire greater access to a commodity traded on a global 
market.  Such provisions of GATT 1994 which could be interpreted as 
barring the subsidization of state trading enterprises for noncommercial 
purposes are explicitly limited by the overarching goals of the agreement.110   
D. Any WTO Member Could Have Initiated Consultation Under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and the Burden Would Have Been 
on China to Show an Absence of a Violation   
In spite of the fact that no generally applicable section of the WTO 
Agreement would have made CNOOC’s financing plan illegal, any WTO 
member would have had standing to attempt to successfully challenge the 
merger under the Dispute Settlement Understanding.111  Article XII of the 
WTO Agreement created a “loophole,” under which the founding WTO 
members could impose additional WTO rules beyond those generally 
applicable on members acceding to the organization after the original entry 
into force.112  This, of course, is the source of China’s peculiar restrictions 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (downloadable in text, Microsoft Word, or 
PDF format) (last visited May 4, 2006). 
109
  See GATT 1994 art. III; see also UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 108, at 11. 
110
  See, e.g., GATT 1994 art. XVII, para. 1.  Article XVII, paragraph 1(b) states that state trading 
enterprises must make purchases or sales “solely in accordance with commercial considerations”; however, 
unlike the similar language in the China Protocol, this provision is intended simply as a modifier of 
paragraph 1(a), which requires state trading enterprises to follow the nondiscrimination and national 
treatment obligations.  An argument could be made that a state trading enterprise which acquires access to a 
commodity for the putative purpose of directing it to the state in preference over other members would be 
acting in anticipation of discriminatory treatment.  However, unless actual discriminatory treatment could 
be demonstrated, no violation of WTO norms would exist.  The WTO, like any reasonable legal system, 
does not preemptively punish its subjects for potential violations of the law.  
111
  DSU art. 3.8; see Qin, supra note 10, at 509-10 (“Under the DSU, the failure of a Member to carry 
out its obligations under a covered agreement is considered a prima facie case of nullification or 
impairment, meaning there is a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other 
Members . . . . Accordingly, should China fail to carry out any of its WTO-plus obligations . . . any other 
WTO Member may seek redress through the WTO dispute settlement system . . . .”). 
112
  WTO Agreement, supra note 9, art. XII.  See generally Qin, supra note 10, at 487-491 (noting 
how the integration of the Working Party Report into the Protocol, and further integrated the Protocol into 
the WTO Agreement, created a separate and unique body of permanent WTO rules that are specific to 
China, and extend far beyond the terminable market access schedules required of either the original 
contracting parties to the agreement or any other acceding state.)  
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with regard to investment subsidies.  As a result of these additional 
obligations, and because the China Protocol is “made an integral part of the 
WTO Agreement,”113 any member of the WTO, whether founding or newly 
admitted, may challenge a violation of the Protocol by China. 
China’s obligations under the Protocol, regardless of reciprocity from 
other members, are technically not unilateral commitments at all.  Rather, 
they are rule obligations that “represent a common agreement among all 
members,” however counterintuitive this may seem.114  As such, the Protocol 
becomes cognizable as part of the greater WTO Agreement for purposes of 
the DSU, and a charge of breach of the commitments invokes a prima facie 
assumption that the accused state has nullified its duties under the 
agreement.115  In such a circumstance, the burden is on the accused state to 
prove that no impairment of commitments occurred.116  As a result of this 
quirk in the intersection of the Protocol’s unique “WTO-plus” nature and the 
burdens of proof under the DSU, delicate commercial transactions by 
Chinese SOEs that would not otherwise offend the generally applicable 
provisions of the WTO agreements may be overshadowed by the threat of 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Body.117  A significant 
burden would be imposed by such a threat to China’s business, regardless of 
the merit of the challenging party’s underlying claims.  This feature of the 
China Protocol promises to eventually bring to light the challenges to WTO 
legitimacy latent in CNOOC-Unocal.  
IV. CNOOC-UNOCAL FORESHADOWS CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW 
IN THE WTO’S DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDERSTANDING  
Perhaps the greatest strength and innovation of the WTO system is 
that it transformed a power-based, diplomacy oriented system of world trade 
regulation into a mostly rules-based and principle-oriented system.118  This 
                                           
113
  Protocol § 1.2.  
114
  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain 
Computer Equipment, WT/DS62, 67 and 68/AB/R, ¶ 109 (June 22, 1998) (holding that independent tariff 
schedules of each member collectively constitute a body of rules applicable to all members); see also Qin, 
supra note 10, at 509. 
115
  See DSU art. 3.8. 
116
  Id. 
117
  The Dispute Settlement Understanding is a many-tiered process that begins with consultations 
between the parties, transitioning to mediation, the formation of Panels to address the disputes, and finally 
the jurisdiction of the permanent Appellate Body to review panel decisions.  Apart from the general 
obligation of good faith under the Agreements, and the requirement that members exercise “good 
judgment” in bringing disputes to the fore contained in DSU art. 3.7, there is no guarantee that burdens of 
the process itself cannot be invoked as an obstacle to the culmination of politically sensitive transactions.  
118
  See Qin, supra note 10, at 514. 
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was not by accident.  A competitive, state-based system regulating tariffs and 
quotas results in overall greater restrictions on international trade.119  This 
consequently nullifies many of the potential benefits of comparative 
advantage for all states, including the powerful.  The rationale of the 
GATT/WTO system from Bretton Woods120 onward has been to utilize 
negotiated agreements between state actors to create a system of rules that 
dismembers barriers to trade and thus increases the collective wealth of the 
entire world.121  While the original incarnation of the GATT was based 
partially on the rule of law, the advent of the WTO institutionalized a 
universally applicable legal system as an indispensable feature of world 
trade.122  Because one of the key components of the rule of law is that the 
law be generally applicable,123 the China Protocol, as demonstrated by its 
possible application to the CNOOC-Unocal merger, threatens the rule of law 
in the WTO system.  
The China Protocol creates discriminatory rules in the WTO system 
that are non-reciprocal and not applicable to any other country.124  These 
obligations are the first WTO rules to shatter the uniformity of the trading 
system and thus significantly impair the rule of the law under the WTO 
agreements.125  Moreover, the “integral” inconsistencies within the WTO 
Agreement created by the China Protocol, and demonstrated by the latent 
rule violation in CNOOC-Unocal, have the potential to give rise to 
substantive conflicts within the agreement itself as WTO member states use 
                                           
119
  See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 108, at 25 (recording overall drop in tariff rates since 
institution of WTO). 
120
  See Benjamin J. Cohen, Bretton Woods System, http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/ 
inpress/bretton.html (last visited May 4, 2006). 
121
  See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 108, at 13 (“The case for open trade”).  
122
  See Qin, supra note 10, at 514; see also UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 108, at 23 (“The 
WTO is ‘rules based’”). 
123
  See Qin, supra note 10, at 514. 
124
 See id. at 515.  It is important to reiterate that the rule obligations in the China Protocol are 
different in kind from the various custom-tailored market access requirements applicable to every WTO 
member-state.  While the market access requirements are imposed according to individualized schedules, 
and are altered when necessary to conform to changed conditions, the obligations of the China Protocol are, 
as an integral part of the WTO Agreement, only subject to amendment via the formal amendment process 
prescribed by the Agreement itself.  See WTO Agreement, supra note 9, art. X (describing structure for 
amendment of covered agreements).  It has been observed that it is “nearly impossible” to amend the WTO 
Agreement, in that to do so requires a consensus of all WTO members.  See Qin, supra note 10, at 485.   
125
 See Qin, supra note 10, at 514.  An argument could be made that the existence of free trade 
agreements and customs unions created non-uniform application of the WTO rules.  Such an argument 
misunderstands the nature of the burdens imposed by the Protocol.  The Protocol is not merely applied 
differently, it is a unique collection WTO rules that are specifically directed at one member and one 
member only.  In other words, it is not a generally applicable rule that interacts differently with different 
members; rather, it is a discriminatory amendment of the actual governing WTO Agreements, and subject 
to the high hurdles of the covered agreements’ amendment process.  
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them for purposes outside the traditional scope of the WTO’s governance.  
These conflicts, when they arise, will require the Dispute Settlement Body’s 
Panels and the WTO Appellate Body to craft substantive rules of decision 
not currently present in the WTO Agreement.  Because the Dispute 
Settlement Body “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligation 
provided in the covered agreements,”126 such substantive rulemaking will 
further impair the legitimacy of—and rule of law within—the WTO.  
A. China’s Discriminatory Rule Obligations Undermine the Core 
Purposes of the WTO Agreement  
Among the WTO’s stated purposes is the “elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”127  It is difficult to 
reconcile this with singular obligations placed on China by the Protocol.  
Simply put, CNOOC-Unocal illustrates that China’s unique WTO rule 
obligations bar behavior that would be acceptable if undertaken by any other 
state.  Whether the type of policy-driven investment subsidies in the 
CNOOC-Unocal funding package are desirable or fair is not particularly 
relevant to the question of how they will affect the WTO system.  What is 
relevant is that the special restrictions contained in the China protocol 
weaken the WTO as a whole.  
The WTO Agreement states that “The WTO shall facilitate the 
implementation, administration and operation, and further the objectives, of 
this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements . . . .”128  The 
objectives of all the covered agreements, while tailored to their individual 
subject matters, are essentially the same: “raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in 
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources . . . .”129  This is to be accomplished by “entering into reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations . . . .”130  These 
goals are echoed throughout all the covered agreements.  Or rather, they are 
echoed throughout all the covered agreements except one. 
                                           
126
  DSU art. 3.2.  
127
  WTO Agreement at pmbl.  
128
  Id. at art. III.1.  
129
  Id. at pmbl. 
130
  Id. (emphasis added).  
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The China Protocol singles out China for dozens of highly specific, 
unique, and detailed disciplines not required of any other WTO member.  
China, of course, assented to the unique rule requirements contained in the 
Working Party Report, and by extension, in the China Protocol and the WTO 
Agreement.131  That said, the fact that China is willing (currently) to 
shoulder the substantial obligations that the China Protocol imposes on it 
does not mean those obligations will not pose greater problems for the WTO 
system as a whole.  Dismantling the uniformity of WTO rule application 
conflicts with the underlying goals of the organization.  
The uniformity of the rule of law in the WTO system was one of the 
major advances in the world trade system when the transition from the 
GATT to the WTO occurred.132  Under the GATT, inconsistent rule 
obligations led to inconsistent and high tariffs rates among member-states, 
albeit lower than those imposed without the GATT.133  One of the major 
flaws in the GATT system was that states with greater negotiating power 
could impose more stringent trade disciplines on less powerful states, thus 
undermining the incentives for developing nations to join the GATT in the 
first place, or to perform on obligations after joining.134  In essence, for all 
but a few GATT members, the balance between benefits and obligations 
under the agreement tilted perilously close to even, making the agreement 
less effective and less legitimate overall.  The WTO sought to cure this 
defect by making the application of trade rules more uniform and thus 
creating greater incentive for states—particularly transitional and developing 
states—to join and perform on the obligations.   This carrot is balanced by 
the stick of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Body in 
cases of nullification or impairment of obligations.135 
CNOOC-Unocal illustrates the discriminatory nature of the China 
Protocol.  No agreement on investment or subsidies, let alone any other 
generally applicable WTO agreement, bars strategic use of subsidies to 
promote greater overseas investment in particular market sectors.  But, as 
U.S. Senators Conrad and Bunning correctly pointed out to the U.S. 
                                           
131
  China’s trade delegation to the accession negotiations were obviously given broad latitude by the 
Chinese government as to the scope of the assorted negotiations that went into the crafting of the Protocol.  
132
  Qin, supra note 10, at 515.  
133
  See id. at 486. 
134
  In distinguishing between the rules-based system of the WTO and the prior power-based system of 
individualized trade rules under GATT 1947, Professor Qin points out that the relative desirability of the 
two systems is subjective, and that a state’s view of the system is necessarily influenced the degree of 
power wielded.  See id. at 519-20.   
135
  Including the presumption that where there is “infringement of the obligations assumed under a 
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.”  
DSU art. 3.8.  
480 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 2 
 
Commerce Secretary,136 China took on obligations that would have allowed 
the United States to use the WTO to block the acquisition of Unocal by 
CNOOC. The motivation for doing so would have been irrelevant.  
In other words, the very existence of the unique rule obligations under 
the China Protocol is at odds with the objectives of the WTO Agreement.  
Aside from directly contradicting the preamubular language of the WTO 
Agreement,137 and so lessening its legitimacy and consistent application, the 
Protocol also creates different classes of WTO members.138  The greater the 
likelihood of being forced into such a class, the fewer the incentives for 
developing and transitional states to join the WTO.  Perhaps more 
importantly, there are also fewer incentives to perform obligations in good 
faith after accession.139  The greater legitimacy and applicability the WTO 
legal structure has among member-states, particularly with respect to its core 
principles of nondiscrimination and national treatment, the more effective 
the WTO will be as a legal system that draws its power from the active 
consent of its subjects.  
The China Protocol poses a serious challenge to the legitimacy of and 
rule of law in the WTO because of its discriminatory nature.  CNOOC-
Unocal demonstrates a feature of the Protocol that is potentially even more 
problematic, however.  Resolving the inconsistencies between the Protocol 
and the generally applicable WTO agreements may well put the Dispute 
Settlement Body in the position of crafting substantive rules of decision—a 
function that is expressly disallowed by its authorizing agreement.  Because 
the dispute settlement mechanisms are at the heart of the WTO’s 
effectiveness, such a challenge to them could seriously undermine the WTO 
as a whole.  
B. Non-Reciprocal “Integral” Obligations Will Necessitate Illegitimate 
Rulemaking by the Panels and Appellate Body  
The unique, non-reciprocal obligations in the China Protocol that 
posed latent challenges to the core principles of the WTO in CNOOC-
Unocal also threaten the legitimacy the opinions by the Dispute Settlement 
                                           
136
 See supra note 37. 
137
  See supra notes 129, 130. 
138
  E.g., those that are only bound by the generally applicable agreements, and those that have 
numerous special and permanent obligations imposed on them individually by the accession process 
loophole under Article X of the WTO Agreement.  
139
  Of particular note are the pending accessions of the Ukraine and the Russian Federation.  See Qin, 
supra note 10, at 515. 
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Body.140  In CNOOC-Unocal, the China Protocol would have barred the 
policy loans from China’s state-owned enterprises to CNOOC, whereas no 
generally applicable WTO rule of law would have imposed similar 
obligations on China or any other WTO member.141  The WTO panels and 
Appellate Body, however, are required to construe the China Protocol 
consistently with all other applicable provisions of the WTO Agreement.142  
At the same time, principles of interpretation of international agreements 
mandate that the panels and Appellate Body give force to the more 
specialized applicable agreements over the less specialized ones—the so-
called lex specialis derogat generalis rule.143  Because these fundamental 
provisions are in conflict—the China Protocol contradicts the fundamental 
principles of the WTO Agreement—the Appellate Body will be forced to 
choose between harmoniously construing the China Protocol with the rest of 
the WTO Agreement and giving effect to the Protocol.  Such a choice will 
extend the range of Appellate Body action beyond the sphere of simple 
interpretation and into the sphere of substantive rulemaking. 
There are specific provisions of the China Protocol—including the bar 
on “non-commercial” loans latent in CNOOC-Unocal—that cannot be 
harmoniously construed with the rest of the WTO Agreement.  Moreover, 
while these provisions are more specialized, in the sense that they deal with 
China and China alone, they are often provide overly general prohibitions 
troubled by hazy and unclear language.  Because of both latent conflicts 
between generally applicable provisions of the WTO and serious ambiguity 
within the specialized provisions in the Protocol, WTO Rules will be applied 
inconsistently between China and other WTO members.  Even more striking, 
such conflicts presage inconsistent application of rules to China itself across 
similar situations.  To resolve interpretative disputes regarding the actual 
content of the conflicting and ambiguous provisions of the China Protocol, 
                                           
140
  The Dispute Settlement Body is made up of all of the members of the WTO acting in an auxiliary 
capacity to their role as negotiating parties to the WTO Agreements.  See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 
supra note 108, at 56.   Any member may request that a quasi-adjudicative panel be formed to rule on the 
dispute.  DSU art. 6.1.  Every disputing member has the right to appeal a panel’s decision to the standing 
WTO Appellate Body for final disposition.  DSU art. 17. 
141
  See supra Part III.  
142
  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, ¶ 81, 
WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (WTO Agreements must be read “in a way that gives meaning to all of 
them, harmoniously”); see also Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO 
Agreements, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 58-59 (2002) (noting that WTO jurisprudence puts an extremely strict 
“gloss” on this “effectiveness” principle that extends beyond that given by the International Law 
Commission.  The Appellate Body does not recognize the possibility of inherent disharmony in treaty 
provisions or provide a means of resolving such conflicts).   
143
  See Lennard, supra note 142, at 70 (noting that the Appellate Body indicated in dicta in 
Indonesia—Autos that it accepted the general legitimacy of the lex specialis rule).  
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the panels and the Appellate Body will be forced to craft “gap-filler” rules 
that have substantive effect.  This will further erode the rule of law in the 
WTO system, because such rulings will directly contravene the DSU’s 
mandate that “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the [Dispute Settlement 
Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided” to 
members in the WTO Agreements.144   
1. Provisions in the China Protocol Invite Inconsistent Application of 
WTO Rules  
Because all of the specific rule commitments in the Working Party 
Report are incorporated into the WTO Agreement through the China 
Protocol, and because many of them conflict with the basic purposes of the 
WTO, it is likely that their application will result in inconsistent and 
confusing application of WTO rules to China.  For example, in CNOOC-
Unocal, Paragraphs 172 and 173 of the Working Party Report would have 
together banned the use of interest rates subsidies in the proposed financing 
package.145  Putting aside for the moment the fact that no other WTO 
country has similar restrictions,146 such a funding package would not have 
been a violation of the Protocol commitments if the loans could be 
demonstrated to have been for a legitimate commercial rationale.  That is to 
say, if a provision was included in the funding package that provided that 
Unocal would repay loans at above market rates in the eventuality that it 
became particularly profitable, then the financing package could be 
characterized as based on commercial considerations, albeit on high risk 
terms.   
It is not at all clear that there is any principled way to determine what 
such specific commitments in the China Protocol mean in practice.  Does the 
Appellate Body have the final word on what constitutes a “commercial” 
rationale for a subsidy forbidden to China but available to all other WTO 
members?  What means should the Appellate Body use to make such a 
determination?  How do the China-specific and uniquely restrictive 
                                           
144
  DSU art. 3.2.  
145
  See supra Part II.D.  
146
  The “elephant in the room,” so to speak, in any discussion of the China Protocol, is why it was 
considered necessary to impose vast numbers of vague and non-reciprocal trade rules on China in the first 
place.  Professor Qin hypothesizes that the “unspoken rationale” behind China’s is to adapt its economy to 
market terms, promote domestic rule of law, and liberalize investment.  That said, she also points out that 
these “rationales,” when applied to specific provisions of the Protocol, are motivated by an underlying 
desire to put a break on China’s potentially vast influence in the world market system.  See Qin, supra note 
10, at 510-11.  
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provisions with regard to investment147 interact with the other WTO 
Agreements, such as TRIMs?  Do the extremely specific measures on state 
trading enterprises in the Working Party Report148 incorporate the general 
exceptions in Article XX of GATT 1994?149  
All these questions point to an overarching one:  what, if any, 
safeguards are there to ensure that the WTO rules in the China Protocol are 
applied consistently and evenly both between different parties and across 
analogous situations?  The simple answer is that there is no such 
guarantee—and it is highly unlikely that without one the provisions will be 
applied in consistent manner among China’s different trading partners and 
across similar Chinese actions.  The result of such inconsistent application 
will be a combination of lessened legitimacy of the rules themselves to all 
members, and pressure on the panels and the Appellate Body to provide 
clarification.  This will result in the WTO’s quasi-judicial organs150 being put 
in the position of trying to fill the gaps between the inconsistent applications 
with increasingly substantive rules of decision. 
2. The Panels and the Appellate Body Will Be Forced to Make 
Substantive “Gap-Filler” Rules 
Canons of treaty construction are made to conflict by the China 
Protocol, and the resolution of those conflicts will amount to substantive 
rulemaking by WTO dispute settlement bodies.  Specifically, three 
interpretive principles interact in unpredictable ways that will push the 
panels and Appellate Body in to the realm of filling the gaps between the 
Protocol and the other WTO Agreements with substantive rules of decision:  
1) the principle of lex specialis,151 which states that among competing terms 
                                           
147
 For example, China must remove foreign equity limitations on joint ventures in automobile engine 
manufacturing.  Working Party Report, para. 207.  This restriction would not be mandated under TRIMs, 
because it has little or no effect on the provision of export or import of goods, but rather is merely a 
restriction on who profits from such trade.  See supra Part III.A.  
148
  See, e.g., Working Party Report, para. 212 (state-owned oil companies must provide that import 
allocations of petroleum to non-state trading companies are held over for the next year if not fully utilized).  
149
  For example, the provision in GATT 1994 art. XX(j), which provides that resources essential to 
the provision of products temporarily in general or local short supply (oil, for example) are excepted from 
GATT disciplines, including those on state trading enterprise, provided certain criteria are met. 
150
  See Ehlermann, supra note 69, at 470 (“Dispute settlement in the WTO is not a process that is 
entrusted in totality to an independent judicial branch.  It would be wrong to qualify it as a purely judicial 
process.  It is a quasi-judicial mechanism.  It is a hybrid.  And it will remain so for the foreseeable future.”).  
151
  See Professors Kurt Taylor Gaubatz and Robert Turner, "Beck's Law Dictionary": A Compendium 
of International Law Terms and Phrases, at http://www.people.virginia.edu/~rjb3v/latin.html (“Lex 
specialis derogat generali - specific law prevails over (abrogates, overrules, trumps) general law. One test 
that is applied in circumstances when (1) both customary and treaty sources of law exist and (2) these two 
sources cannot be construed consistently.”); cf. WTO, Committee for Trade and the Environment, CTE on: 
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in international agreements the term which more specifically prescribes law 
is assumed to control, 2) the presumption of consistent use of the same terms 
across a single agreement or related agreements,152 and 3) the principle that 
effect should be given to all the provisions of an agreement.153 
Applied to the China Protocol, the principle of lex specialis gives 
inadequate guidance as to which potentially inconsistent terms present in the 
voluminous (and not very carefully drafted) Working Party Report would 
supersede apparently conflicting rights and obligations under the generally 
applicable WTO Agreements.  For example, in CNOOC-Unocal, the 
ordinary meaning of “commercial considerations” applies broadly, arguably 
reaching into areas where there would be no conceivable distortion of trade 
caused by the forbidden act.  In contrast, the “commercial considerations” 
provisions in Article XVII of GATT 1994, from which the language of the 
commitments was presumably lifted, only bar those subsidies to state trading 
enterprises that will distort trade.154  In other words, by giving effect to the 
China Protocol under the lex specialis rule, it is necessary as a preliminary 
matter to disregard consistent application of the same terms through out the 
“integrated” WTO Agreements.  If the agreements are indeed a single 
coherent whole, it is difficult to say in which circumstances the terms should 
be given one meaning over another.  Should terms that appear in both the 
Protocol and other agreements always be given a more restrictive application 
when applied to China?  That hardly jibes with the nondiscrimination 
principle.  What if provisions of both the Protocol and the other agreements 
govern situations with equal authority?  Should the harshest one be selected?  
Should the most lenient?  Why?  Because the broad strokes of the Protocol 
are more “specialized” than the carefully honed language of the major 
agreements? 
Similarly, application of lex specialis to the China Protocol potentially 
nullifies the effectiveness of specific provisions of the WTO agreements.  
                                                                                                                              
Trade Rules, Environmental Agreements and Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ 
cte01_e.htm#lexspecialis (last visited May 4, 2006) (“The principle of ‘lex specialis’ in public international 
law says that if all parties to a treaty conclude a more specialized treaty, the provisions of the latter prevail 
over those of the former.  This . . . would likely be taken into account in the WTO.”). 
152
  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Meat and Meat 
Products, ¶ 164, WT/DS26/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998) (different words are presumed to have different 
meanings; ergo, the same words are presumed to have the same meanings); see also Lennard, supra note 
142, at 56-57 (“There is a presumption . . . that terms are generally used consistently in a treaty, so that 
different terms are intended to have different meanings.”). 
153
  See Lennard, supra note 142, at 57. 
154
  That is, import restrictions and domestic content requirements.  See GATT 1994 art. XVII.1(a) 
(state trading enterprises must “act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory 
treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private 
traders.”).  
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For example, the provision in TRIMs which provides that all trade-related 
investment measures be subject to the exceptions of GATT 1994 may or may 
not be applicable to China under the Protocol, depending on the decisions of 
the Dispute Settlement Body.155  Dozens (hundreds?) of similar interpretive 
puzzles will arise in attempts to reconcile China’s obligations under the 
Protocol with the greater (though not longer) agreement into which it is 
putatively “integrated”. 
This is relevant not only because it will provide lifetimes of fodder for 
trade lawyers as China continues its ascent to prominence in the world 
trading system.  It will also drastically expand the role of the Appellate Body 
and the panels from the somewhat workaday interpretative duties that they 
have had to date156 to what is essentially common law rule making regarding 
the scope and application of the WTO Agreement to China.  Moreover, the 
organs of the Dispute Settlement Body will be forced to determine the 
degree to which China’s trading partners can impose novel restrictions on 
China’s economic behavior via the Working Party Report.  
For example, it hardly stretches the imagination to envision a 
circumstance in the near future in which a WTO member feels threatened by 
China’s growing economic influence in the energy sector.  Imagine that 
member using the Protocol to challenge the subsidization of a Chinese 
energy company under the DSU in order to prevent the consummation of a 
politically sensitive acquisition in a third state.  Notwithstanding the 
injunction in the DSU that “a Member shall exercise its judgment as to 
whether action under these procedures would be fruitful,”157 such a 
maneuver could be effective in casting a pall over a transaction to the extent 
that the outcome could be uncertain.  Such uncertainty would require the 
Dispute Settlement Body to effectively decide the scope and coverage of the 
Protocol with relation to the other WTO Agreements.  Such a decision could 
have a considerable effect on China’s trade relations, and would most 
certainly “add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided” in the 
Protocol.158 
                                           
155
  TRIMs art. 3.  Note that China made numerous investment commitments in the Working Party 
Report, such as forsaking technology transfer requirements, that are not mandated by TRIMs. 
156
  Such basic interpretive duties are themselves the cause of significant controversy in defining the 
scope of the WTO.  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 149, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter United States—Shrimp] 
(holding that the chapeau of GATT 1994, art. XX prevented the use of endangered species preservation as a 
basis to except trade restriction from GATT 1994 disciplines).  
157
  DSU art. 3.7.  
158
  See DSU art. 3.2. 
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3. Substantive Rulemaking by the Dispute Settlement Body Will 
Undermine the Rule of Law in the WTO 
The Dispute Settlement Body and its organs, the panels and the 
Appellate Body, are expressly forbidden by the DSU from adding to or 
lessening the rights and obligations on individual members as a result of 
deliberations.159  Article 3.2 of the DSU reads, in its entirety:  
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element 
in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.  The Members recognize that it serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.  Recommendations 
and rulings of the [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.160   
The DSU is at the heart of the WTO system161 and is only authorized 
to make interpretive rulings on the WTO Agreements. The greater the 
substantive content of its decisions, the more likely it is that they, and the 
WTO system as a whole, will be viewed as illegitimate by both member 
governments and their citizens. 
The WTO is, by its very nature, a consent-based organization.162  
Substantive rules that impose rights and obligations on members may only 
be crafted during the negotiating rounds by the WTO Ministerial 
Conference, consisting of all members.163  The only legitimate basis for 
binding rules under the WTO consists solely of agreement by the 
participating member states on the basis of consensus, when possible, and 
                                           
159
  Id.   
160
  Id.  
161
  The DSU is the central innovation of the WTO Agreement compared to its predecessors—the 
provision of compulsory jurisdiction combined with the finality of rulings of the Appellate Body has 
transformed the loosely enforced, power-centered GATT into the structured, effective rules-based WTO.  
See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 108, at 55.  In fairness, this effectiveness in compelling 
state behavior is also very much at the root of criticisms directed at the WTO.  See, e.g., United States—
Shrimp.  
162
  See WTO Agreement art.IX.1 (“The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by 
consensus followed under GATT 1947(1). Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be 
arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting.”).  
163
  See WTO Agreement art. IX.2 (“The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have 
the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements.”). 
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democratic voting when not.  Any extension of the role of the panels and 
Appellate Body into the realm of substantively determining the rules of 
decision for members will severely undermine the rule of law in the WTO 
system.  The latent problems posed by CNOOC-Unocal are only illustrative 
of a deeper problem: non-reciprocal agreements such as the China Protocol 
fundamentally undermine the rule of law in the WTO system.  
Large states with transitional economies are poised for accession to 
the WTO.164  The members of the WTO, particularly influential members 
like the United States, are thus faced with a decision:  they can forbear from 
imposing conflicting rules like those in the China Protocol, or they use the 
WTO as a mechanism for stifling the economic growth of competing states.  
Should the current WTO members choose to create more “WTO-plus” 
agreements that codify non-reciprocal and discriminatory rules into the 
WTO Agreement, they will lessen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
entire organization.  It remains to be seen whether the Protocol itself is 
sufficient to reduce the WTO from its rules-based ideal back to the power-
based squabbling of the GATT.  Should the flaws of the Protocol be 
replicated, however, the gains that the WTO has made for the rule of law in 
international trade will certainly evaporate.   
V. CONCLUSION 
When China sought to acquire Unocal by providing loan subsidies to 
state-owned CNOOC, it violated commitments in its accession Protocol to 
the WTO.  China agreed when it joined the WTO that it would not use 
subsidies to its state-owned enterprises to further government policies, like 
securing greater access to oil reserves.  A key commitment in the China 
Protocol was that the decisions of China’s SOEs would be on a “commercial 
basis,” and that those decisions would be solely on the basis of profit and 
loss.  Simply put, the low-interest loans proffered by China to CNOOC were 
unprofitable.  Had the CNOOC-Unocal acquisition been completed with the 
proposed funding package, China would have been violating its WTO 
Commitments.  This latent restriction is characteristic of a greater problem 
posed by the Protocol.  
The non-reciprocal, “WTO-plus” rules contained in the Protocol mark 
a departure from the generally applicable, rules-based principles upon which 
the WTO was founded.  This challenges the very legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the WTO.  Moreover, inherent conflicts between the China 
Protocol and the generally applicable WTO agreements will force the panels 
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  See supra note 139.  
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and Appellate body to make WTO “common law.”  Because the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding specifically forbids such rule making, the Protocol 
will undermine the overall legitimacy and rule of law within the WTO.  How 
much damage the Protocol will cause remains to be seen, but the potential 
harm is great.  Whether or not the damage caused by the Protocol will spread 
depends on the choices made by current WTO members.  They can either 
forbear from imposing discriminatory restrictions during future accessions, 
or they can watch the WTO crumble as they craft unique rules at the expense 
of transitional states.  
  
 
